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The Impact of Government-Sponsored Training Programs
on the Labor Market Transitions of Disadvantaged Men*
Lucie Gilbert†, Thierry Kamionka‡, Guy Lacroix§
Résumé / Abstract
Dans cet article, nous cherchons à déterminer l'impact des mesures actives
d'insertion sur les transitions des jeunes prestataires masculins de l'aide de dernier
recours sur le marché du travail. La richesse des données à notre disposition nous
permet de recréer de façon très détaillée l'historique de chaque prestataire sur une
période relativement longue. Nous avons recours à un modèle de durée en temps
continue pour estimer la densité des durées observées dans plus de sept états
différents. L'endogénéité de la présence dans une mesure active est explicitement
prise en compte. Nous analysons la sensibilité des paramètres estimés en
comparant les résultats d'un modèle non-paramétrique standard avec ceux de
plusieurs modèles paramétriques à deux ou trois facteurs de charge. Nos résultats
montrent que les jeunes hommes peu scolarisés qui participent à des mesures
actives destinées aux prestataires d'aide de dernier recours ont davantage de
difficultés à s'intégrer au marché du travail que ceux qui ne participent pas à des
telles mesures. En revanche, les mesures d'insertion offertes dans le cadre du
programme d'assurance-emploi semblent donner de meilleurs résultats. De façon
générale, la durée dans chacun des sept états considérés est sensible aux variables
considérées dans l'analyse, soient les prestations d'aide de dernier recours, le
salaire minimum, et le taux de chômage.
The analysis focuses on the impact of government-sponsored training
programs aimed at disadvantaged male youths on their labour market transitions.
The richness of the data at our disposal allows us to recreate very detailed
individual histories over a relatively long period. We use a continuous time
duration model to estimate the density of duration times in as many as seven
states, controlling for the endogeneity of an individual’s training status. We
investigate the sensitivity of the parameter estimates by comparing a typical non-
parametric specification with a series of parametric two-factor loading models, as
well as a parametric three-factor loading model. Our results show that young,
poorly educated males who participate in welfare training programs do worse on
the labour market than those who do not participate. On the other hand,
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participation in unemployment training programs provides them some benefits. In
general, we find that duration times in any of the seven states considered are
sensitive to variations in program parameters such as welfare benefits, policy
variables such as the minimum wage rate, and in the economic environment as
proxied by the unemployment rate.
Mots Clés : Modèle de durée multi-états multi-épisodes, hétérogénéité non-paramétrique,
mesures active d'insertion, aide de dernier recours
Keywords: Multi-state multi-episods duration model, non-parametric heterogeneity, training
programs, welfare
1 Introduction
The impact of government-sponsored training programs has been extensively studied in the
past couple of decades.1 In many countries, such programs have become an integral part of
public policies aiming at enhancing self-sufficiency among vulnerable groups. The program
costs have escalated as they have become more comprehensive and more systematically used.
Not surprisingly, policy makers have shown renewed interest in obtaining accurate and reliable
estimates of their efficacy.
The discussions surrounding the efficacy or desirability of training programs rest on com-
plex methodological issues. The main concern lies with proper treatment of an individual’s
decision to participate in such programs. Severe biases may arise if unobserved individual
characteristics that affect the decision to participate are somehow related to the unobservables
that affect outcomes on the labour market. Two approaches have been proposed in the evalua-
tion literature to address the so-called issue of “self-selection”. The first is the “experimental
approach”, based on random assignment of applicants into treatment or control groups. The
second is the “non-experimental”, or “econometric approach”, and relies on non-random sam-
ples of participants and non-participants. Each approach tackles the self-selection issue from
a different angle, but the relative merit of each is still the subject of debate [see Heckman and
Smith (1995), Burtless (1995), Ham and LaLonde (1996)].
Most would argue that the “experimental” approach is best suited to eliminate self-selection
biases and provide adequate mean program impacts, however measured. Yet, recently this
view has been challenged by Ham and LaLonde (1996) in their important paper. In essence
they argue that random assignment between control and experimental groups provides an ad-
equate short-term mean program impact. On the other hand, the treatment and controls ex-
periencing subsequent spells of employment and unemployment are most likely not random
subsets of the initial groups because the sorting process is very different for the two. In other
words, random assignment does not guarantee that long-term mean program impacts are void
of any systematic biases.
In most countries, experimental evaluation of training programs is impracticable due to a
lack of appropriate data. Analysts must instead concentrate either on survey or administrative
data, and rely on multi-state transition models. An additional difficulty in using these data is
that program participation must be modeled explicitly. Many recent papers have nevertheless
managed to successfully model complex transition patterns using such data (Gritz (1993),
Bonnal, Fougère and Sérandon (1997) and Mealli, Pudney and Thomas (1996)). Most papers
are limited to three separate states of the labour market: employment, unemployment (non-
1See Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) for a recent and detailed survey.
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employment) and training.2 In many cases data limitations do not allow identification of any
more states. In other cases, analysts purposely focus on few states to keep the statistical
model tractable. Indeed, when the data is drawn from stock samples, as is often the case when
using administrative data, the statistical model must account for so-called “initial conditions”
problems. This usually adds considerable complexity to an already involved statistical model.3
On the other hand, many have questioned the appropriateness of focusing of few labour market
states (Heckman and Flinn (1983), Jones and Riddell (1999)).
This paper investigates the impact of government training programs aimed at poorly edu-
cated Canadian male welfare recipients. It should be stressed at the outset that in Canada, as in
many European countries, the welfare system aims at supporting individuals without income
and who are not entitled to any other social security benefits, irrespective of age.4 As such,
it acts as a safety net for unemployed workers who do not qualify for benefits, or who have
exhausted their unemployment benefits. Many programs are available to assist these long
term unemployed and those with few skills increase their employability. Understandably, a
considerable proportion of program resources has been targeted towards the youths in the past
decade. Yet, many have questioned the ability of traditional programs to address the problem
[OECD, 1998]. The aim of this paper is precisely to investigate the impact of these programs
in enhancing the self-sufficiency of young males welfare claimants, a particular disadvantaged
group (see Beaudry and Green (1997)).
The empirical strategy is similar to that used by Gritz (1993) and Bonnal et al. (1997) in
that we explicitly account for selectivity into the training programs. It relies on a rich dataset
that tracks the transitions of a large number of individuals on a weekly basis across seven dif-
ferent states of the labour market. These states include employment, unemployment, welfare,
out of the labour force (OLF), two separate welfare training programs, and unemployment
training programs. In all, as many as 24 different transitions are allowed in the model. The
sample is drawn from the population of welfare recipients that experienced a spell at any time
between 1987 and 1993 in the province of Québec, Canada. To be included in the sample,
individuals had to be aged 18 or 19 at any time during that period and to have less than a high-
school degree. Sample stratification is used to avoid over-parameterization of the statistical
model that would result if too many exogenous variables had to be controlled for.
2One notable exception is Bonnal et al. (1997) who consider as many as 6 different states: permanent employ-
ment, temporary employment, public policy employment (training), unemployment, out-of-labour-force (non-
employment), and an absorbing state (attrition).
3Two biases are likely to result from stock samples: (1) length-bias; (2) inflow-rate bias. The former may
arise because lengthy spells are more likely to be ongoing at the time the sample is chosen. The latter is related
to the fact that the probability of being sampled is related to the probability of starting a fresh spell at time the
sample is chosen. See Gouriéroux and Monfort (1992) and Van den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder (1994) for a
detailed analysis.
4Individuals must be aged over 18 to qualify for benefits, although single parents less than 18 still qualify.
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By merging various administrative data files we can recreate complete individuals’ histo-
ries on the labour market back to age 16, the legal school-leaving age in Canada. Consequent-
ly, each individual in our sample is necessarily observed in the OLF state at the beginning
of his history. This sampling scheme thus removes the necessity to control for stock sample
biases and has the additional benefit of providing rich transition patterns over a relatively long
sample frame.
The econometric model is built on continuous labour market transitions processes and
allows entry rates into each state to depend on observed and unobserved heterogeneity com-
ponents. Heterogeneity terms can be destination-specific, origin-specific or both. In all cases,
correlation across heterogeneity terms is allowed. We further investigate the sensitivity of the
parameter estimates to various distributions of the heterogeneity components. When paramet-
ric distribution functions are used, the model is estimated by Simulated Maximum Likelihood
(SML).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed descrip-
tion the data. Section 3 discusses the econometric model and the various statistical assumption
regarding the distributions of the heterogeneity terms. Section 4 reports our empirical findings.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Data Description
The basic data used for this study are drawn from the caseload records of Québec’s Ministère
de la Solidarité sociale. The files contain information on all individuals having received wel-
fare benefits at some time between January 1987 and December 1993. In particular, the start
dates and end dates of each welfare and welfare training spells are recorded in the files. The
welfare program contains special provisions for those who are indisposed for work due to
mental or physical impediments. These individuals are not included in the sample. Thus the
final sample comprises only individuals that have no handicap or only a minor, intermediate,
or temporary physical handicap. Furthermore, they are fit to work.
The welfare administrative files contain no information on employment or unemployment
spells. Our sample was thus linked to the Status Vector files (SV) and the Record of Employ-
ment (ROE) files, both under the aegis of Human Resources Development Canada. These files
contain very detailed weekly information on insured unemployment spells and employment
spells, respectively. The start dates and end dates of each spell are recorded in these files.
Similar information is available with respect to training spells administered under the Unem-
ployment Insurance (UI) program. Merging all three administrative files allows us to define
seven different states on the labour market. Aside from the welfare, unemployment and em-
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ployment states, we can identify two separate welfare training states and one unemployment
training state.5
The focus of this paper is on poorly educated young men. Thus to be included in the
sample, an individual had to be either 18 or 19 years of age at any time between 1987 and
1993 and have completed less than 11 years of schooling over the sample period. A high-
school degree in Québec usually entails at least 12 years of schooling. In principle, then,
none of the individuals in our sample has earned a high-school diploma. With these selection
criteria the final sample contains 3068 individuals.
The upper panel of Table 1 provides summary statistics for individuals who have not par-
ticipated in a training program. The lower panel presents similar statistics for program partic-
ipants. In the latter case, the mean durations in either employment, unemployment or welfare
are calculated both before and after training. An examination of the table reveals that the two
groups are very similar in terms of their observable characteristics; They both have the same
average age and nearly identical schooling levels. Yet, there are significant differences in their
respective labour market experiences. For instance, non-trainees have longer spells in each of
the three states reported in the table. On the whole, the proportion of time non-trainees spend
employed is slightly larger than that of trainees prior to training. On the other hand, once they
have had training, the proportion of time trainees spend employed become larger than that of
non-trainees. This increase stems from the fact that the average employment duration decreas-
es proportionately less that the average duration of welfare and unemployment spells. Taken
at face value, this would suggest training programs benefit somewhat to welfare recipients.
Recall that only individuals who experienced a welfare spell between 1987 and 1993 and
who were aged 18 or 19 during that period are included in the sample. Those who are 18 or
19 years of age in January 1987 may have already been on the labour market for 2–3 years
at most. In order to recreate their complete labour market histories as of the age of 16, it is
necessary in some cases to go back as early as January 1984.6 The start date and end date of
each spell is used to create individual histories on the labour market. Overlaps between states
5The welfare files contain information dating back to 1979 and ending in December 1993. The SV files
contains information beginning in January 1987 and ending in December 1996. Finally, The ROE files contain
information ranging from January 1975 to December 1996. The analysis focuses on the 1987–1993 period due
to data limitations.
6Data concerning unemployment spells are available only as of January 1987. Consequently, a small propor-
tion of unemployment spells occurring prior to 1987 may be wrongly coded as out of the labour force (OLF).
Two factors lead us to believe that the proportion of such spells is likely insignificant. First, the large majority of
individuals who were 18 or 19 years of age in the years 1990 and beyond where in the OLF, the employment or
the welfare states between 16 and 19. Second, of those individuals, the majority who had an employment spell
would not have qualified for UI benefits given the eligibility rules that prevailed between 1984 and 1987.
A similar problem arises with respect to employment spells. Indeed, spells that were ongoing in December
1993 will not show up in the ROE files until they are terminated. To avoid misclassifying these spells as OLF,
the ROE files are searched as late as December 1996. Given the average length of employment spells reported
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are frequent and are not necessarily the result of coding errors. It may well be, for example,
that a welfare spell and a work spell overlap. Program designs do not forbid this. In principle,
such overlaps could be redefined as a separate state. Given the number of possible states, it is
simply not reasonable to allow these overlaps in the analysis. It was decided that, as a rule,
starting dates would have precedence over ongoing spells. Thus an ongoing spell with known
end date is truncated whenever a new state starts prior to the end date.7
The 3 068 individuals in our sample experienced as many as 31 422 spells over the sample
period. Table 2 presents all the transitions that occurred at any given point in the sample
period. The table identifies seven separate states on the labour market. Welfare Training
includes various job search assistance programs as well as skill enhancing programs aimed
at welfare recipients. The Job-Reentry Program (JRP) is an on-the-job training program also
aimed at welfare recipients. Under this program, participants do not receive benefits but a
(subsidized) salary from a regular employer.8 JRP is treated separately because contrary to
other programs most participants qualify for unemployment benefits upon completion. UI is
a state in which individuals receive unemployment benefits. Individuals that do not work and
that do not qualify for benefits are treated as out of the labour force (OLF) for the purpose of
this study. It must thus be kept in mind that UI is not necessarily akin to unemployment in the
usual sense. UI Training comprises a series of training programs aimed at UI claimants. The
OLF state is the complement of all other states. It includes full-time students, non-entitled
unemployed individuals and individuals that are truly out of the labour force.
Table 2 reveals interesting dynamics on the labour market. For instance, the majority of
welfare spells end either in employment, in welfare training or OLF. Likewise, welfare train-
ing spells end either in welfare, in employment or in OLF. Interestingly, most JRP participants
enter regular employment upon completion of their program. Very few enter UI even though
most qualify for benefits. Other transitions are as expected, except perhaps for UI training.
Indeed, the majority of participants return to UI upon completion of their program and very
few find regular employment. A number of cells contain few or no observations. The empty
cells are consistent with program or policy parameters that prevent a number of transitions to
occur or are a consequence of our definitions of the various states.9 Only transitions compris-
in Table 1, it is very unlikely that many employment spells that were ongoing in December 1993 will still be
ongoing as late as December 1996, and thus wrongly classified as OLF.
7Preliminary analysis was also conducted giving the end date precedence over the start date of a new spell.
The resulting transitions matrices and average durations are very robust to this strategy.
8Non-profit organizations have to pay a symbolic 1$ per working day. The participants receive regular bene-
fits.
9For example, the welfare files provide information on a monthly basis. Any interruption lasting between
1-3 weeks will not be recorded in the data. The record will show an uninterrupted sequence of monthly benefits
receipt. Thus Welfare-Welfare transitions are not identifiable in the data. On the other hand, UI spells are
recorded on a weekly basis. Unemployed workers that work a number of weeks or hours while claiming benefits
5
ing more than 75 observations will be considered in the econometric model. This leaves a
total of 24 transitions to be modeled explicitly.
The transitions on the labour market have three essential dimensions: the state of origin,
the state of destination and the duration in any a given state. Table 2 provides useful informa-
tion on the first two dimensions. One way to represent all three dimensions simultaneously
is to look at the distribution of the sample across all seven states on a weekly basis. This
distribution synthesizes both the transitions across states and the mean duration in each.
Figure 1 plots the proportion of individuals in each of the seven states on a weekly basis.
The top portion of the figure traces out the proportion of individuals in non-training states
(welfare, unemployment, employment, OLF), and the bottom portion traces out the propor-
tions in training states (UI training, welfare training and JRP). There are two distinct features
that arise in January 1987 in the top portion of the figure. First, the proportion of individuals in
OLF is relatively high. This partly reflects a cohort effect. In January 1987, our sample com-
prises only individuals that are 18 or 19 years of age. Not surprisingly, a large proportion of
them are either still in school or have not yet entered the labour market. As we move rightward
along the time axis, these individuals become older and new 18-19 year old entrants join the
sample. By the time we reach December 1993, the oldest individuals are between 25–26 years
of age. It does not necessarily follow that the sample’s average age increases systematically
along the time axis. Proportionately more individuals have entered the sample in the recession
years 1989–1992 than previously. Second, the proportion of unemployed individuals is zero.
As mentioned earlier, the information on unemployment spells is only available as of January
1987. Consequently, only new spells are identifiable in the data. Spells that were ongoing in
January 1987 are classified as OLF in the figure.
The bottom portion of the figure also indicates that the proportion of individuals in JRP
is zero up until approximately January-February 1990. This program was implemented in
August 1989 and had too few participants in the beginning months to show up in the figure.
Similarly, participation in UI training programs is essentially zero up until February-March
1987. UI training usually occurs after a number of weeks has been spent unemployed. Not
surprisingly, then, a certain laps of time is needed before the proportion of UI trainees is large
enough to show up in the figure. Training spells that were ongoing in January 1987 are also
classified as OLF.
A close look at Figure 1 reveals interesting patterns. First, the proportion of welfare partic-
ipants remains relatively constant between 1987 and 1989. The economic downturn of 1989
results in an steady increase in the proportion of welfare claimants until the end of 1993. In
fact, the proportion increased from 17.9% in January 1988 to 42.3% in December 1993. Such
may qualify for additional benefits once they exhaust their original entitlement. The SV files will indicate a new
UI spell starting the week following exhaustion. Thus UI-UI transitions are identifiable in the data.
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an increase results from both a more important inflow into welfare and longer spell duration
[see Duclos, Fortin, Lacroix and Roberge (1999) for details].
The proportion of employed individuals follows a very distinct seasonal pattern with peaks
occurring around June-July and troughs around January of each year. Despite these seasonal
fluctuations, the proportion of employed individuals increased from 31.2% in January 1988 to
33.5% in January 1990, and then gradually declined to 18.6% in January 1993. The proportion
of unemployed individuals is highly negatively correlated with the proportion of employed
individuals. The seasonal fluctuations almost perfectly mirror those of employment. Finally,
the proportion of individuals in the OLF state also depicts strong seasonal patterns. In January
of each year, the proportion of those in OLF increases by about 5 percentage points. It is likely
that many seasonal workers lose their job at the beginning of each year and do not qualify for
unemployment benefits.
The bottom portion of the figure shows that the proportion of individuals engaged in
government-sponsored training programs fluctuates considerably over time. A number of new
welfare training programs have been implemented in 1989. Most of these programs aim at
enhancing job search skills and usually last a few weeks. The large increase in the propor-
tion of welfare trainees coincide with the implementation of these programs. A dramatic fall
occurs towards the end of 1989 presumably linked to budgetary constraints associated with
the economic downturn of 1990. The proportion of participants steadily increases thereafter
and reaches its peak at the end of 1993. The proportion of UI trainees is relatively constant
throughout the whole period, with the exception of 1992. Both the UI training programs and
JRP have relatively few participants at any point in time.
The proportions of participants in the combined programs hardly reach beyond 5% over
the sample period. The fact that few individuals are engaged in formal training at any point
in time is no indication that training programs are inefficient or unattractive. Access to pro-
grams is often limited because of insufficient resources. This lack of resources raises a fun-
damental question: who gets selected into training ? To the econometrician, participation in
a training program is the result of two separate unidentifiable processes. First, the participant
has undertaken the necessary steps to take part in the program. Second, the program man-
ager has deemed the participant as eligible. These two processes are likely to be such that
participants have unobservable (to the econometrician) characteristics that are systematically
different from those of the non-participants. Fortunately, given the information at our disposal
it is possible to devise estimators that, under very general assumptions, will yield unbiased
estimates of the programs’ impacts. These estimators are presented in the next section.
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Figure 2: Labour market history of a hypothetical individual.
3 Modeling labour market transitions
The labour market history of a given individual is represented by a sequence of n spells of
various lengths in any of K (=7) states. Let xt be the state in which an individual is observed
to be at time t. The sequence starts at calendar time τ0 = 0 when the individual is 16 years
of age and ends at time τe (τe = December 1993). Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical sequence
made up of 3 spells of various length in 3 different states. As depicted, the individual is initially
observed in the OLF state. He enters into employment at time τ1 and eventually moves into
unemployment at time τ2. At time τe he is still in the midst of an unemployment spell.
Let τ` denote the calendar time at which a spell in any given state ends. Each spell `
(1 ≤ ` ≤ n) is thus delimited by the start time τ`−1 and the end time τ` (τ` > τ`−1). Let u` be
the duration of spell ` (u` = τ` − τ`−1). Finally, let r denote a complete sequence from time 0
to time τe :
r = ((u1, xτ1), . . ., (un−1, xτn−1), (un, 0)),
where un = τe− τn−1 is the duration of the last spell. The last spell of each individual is right-
censored since τn and xτn are not observed. On the other hand, the last spell must have lasted
8
at least τe − τn−1 units of time in state xτn−1 . Because xτn is not observed we conventionally
fix xτn = 0.
The sequence may be more compactly rewritten as:
r = (y1, . . ., yn),
where
y` =
{
(u`, xτ`), if 1 ≤ ` ≤ n− 1,
(un, 0), if ` = n.
The initial state, x0, is the same for each individual in our sample and exogenously de-
termined by school attendance laws. Consequently, there is no need to explicitly model the
initial state in which individuals are observed.
3.1 Likelihood function
Each individual contributes a sequence r = (y1, . . ., yn) to the likelihood function. The contri-
bution can be written conditionally on a vector of exogenous variables, z, and an unobserved
heterogeneity factor, ν.
Let lv(θ) denote the conditional contribution of the sequence r. We have,
lv(θ) =
n∏
`=1
f(y` | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ),
where f(y` | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ) is the conditional density of y` given y1, . . ., y`−1, z and ν,
and θ ∈ Θ ⊂ IRp is a vector of parameters. Naturally, the destination state of the last spell is
unknown since the duration is censored. Its contribution to the conditional likelihood function
is limited to the survivor function of the observed duration.
The random variable ν is assumed to be independently and identically distributed across
individuals, and independent from the exogenous variables z. If the unobserved heterogeneity
can take only a finite number of values, ν1, . . ., νJ , the contribution of a sequence r to the
likelihood function is
l(θ) =
J∑
j=1
n∏
`=1
f(y` | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; νj; θ) pij, (1)
where pij is the probability that the unobserved heterogeneity term takes the value νj (0 ≤
pij ≤ 1, ∑Jj=1 pij = 1).
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If ν is a continuous random variable, then
l(θ) =
∫
V
n∏
`=1
f(y` | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ) g(ν; γ) d ν, (2)
where g(ν; γ) is a density probability function and V is the support of ν.
Furthermore, if we assume that Y` is independent of Y1, . . ., Y`−2 given Y`−1 = y`−1, Z = z
and the value of the unobserved term ν, in which case
f(y` | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ) = f(y` | y`−1; z; ν; θ).
Given the history of the process, the joint distribution of the duration of spell ` and the
destination state only depends on the current state on the labour market. This assumption will
be relaxed by introducing other characteristics of the history of the process.
3.2 Modeling individual spells
In this section we focus on the conditional distribution of y` = (u`, xτ`), where u` is the dura-
tion of the `th spell in state xτ`−1 . Define u∗`,k as the waiting time before leaving state xτ`−1 for
state xτ` . At the end of the `th spell, the individual will enter into the state corresponding to the
smallest latent duration u∗`,k′ . We will assume that these K latent durations are independently
distributed.
Thus the duration of spell ` is given by10
u` = inf
k′
u∗`,k′ .
Let fj(u | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ) denote the probability density function (p.d.f.) of the latent
duration u∗`,j , given the history of the process up to time τ`−1, ν and covariates z. Let Sj(u |
y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ) be the corresponding survivor function:
Sj(u | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ) =
∫ +∞
u
fj(s | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ) d s.
The conditional joint density of the duration of spell ` and the destination state k is given
by the following expression
10If the transition from state i to state j cannot be observed, we assume that the corresponding latent distribu-
tion is defective and put a set a probability mass equal to one on +∞.
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f(u, k|y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ) = fk(u | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ)
K∏
j=1
j 6=k
Sj(u | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ),
= hk(u|y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ)S(u|y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ),
where hk(u | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ) is the hazard function associated with the latent duration u∗`,k
and S(u | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ) is the survivor function of the duration of the `th spell. Because
the latent durations are assumed to be conditionally independent we have
S(u | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ) =
K∏
j=1
Sj(u | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ),
where u ≥ 0. The expression represents the conditional probability that the duration of spell `
is at least equal to u or, equivalently, that all latent durations are at least equal to u. Therefore,
the conditional contribution of a given sequence to the likelihood function is:
lv(θ) =
n∏
`=1
K∏
k=1
hk(u | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ)δ`,k Sk(u | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ),
where δ`,k is equal to 1 if the individual enters into state k at the end of spell ` and to 0
otherwise :
δ`,k =
{
1, if xτ` = k,
0, otherwise,
` = 1, . . ., n.
3.3 Unobserved heterogeneity
So far the discussion surrounding the unobserved heterogeneity components has voluntarily
been kept general. The use of maximum likelihood procedures requires that we specify dis-
tribution functions for these components. Most applications rely on the work of Heckman
and Singer (1984) and approximate arbitrary continuous distributions using a finite number
of mass points (see Gritz (1993), Ham and Rea (1987)). More recent papers use richer spec-
ifications that allow the heterogeneity terms to be correlated across states (see Bonnal et al.
(1997), Ham and LaLonde (1996)). These specifications are sometimes referred to as single or
two-factor loading distributions and are also based on a finite set of mass points. In our work,
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we wish to investigate the robustness of the parameter estimates to various distributional as-
sumptions. We will use two and three-factor loading distributions as in the aforementioned
papers. Additionally, we will investigate the consequences on the slope parameters of using
various continuous distributions instead of the usual finite sets of mass points.
To fix ideas, let w = (w1, . . ., wK) be a vector of unobserved heterogeneity variables,
with wk a destination-specific component (k = 1, . . ., K). Ideally, the joint distribution of the
unobserved heterogeneity terms should not be independent.
Consider first a two-factor loading model (see Van den Berg (1997)) such that
wk = exp(ak v1 + bk v2), (3)
where v1 ∈ {−2, c2}, v2 ∈ {c1, c2}, bk ∈ IR, ak = 1I [k ≥ 2 ] and b1 = 1. The random
variables v1 and v2 are assumed to be independent. The constraints imposed on the support
of v1 and v2 are sufficient for identification and to allow the correlation between log(wk) and
log(wk′) to span the interval [−1; 1].
Moreover, assume that
Prob[(V1, V2) = (v01, v02)] =

p2, if v01 = −2 and v02 = c1,
p ∗ (1− p), if v01 = −2 and v02 = c2,
(1− p) ∗ p, if v01 = c2 and v02 = c1,
(1− p)2, if v01 = c2 and v02 = c2,
(4)
where c1, c2 ∈ IR and the probability p is defined as
p =
exp(d)
1 + exp(d)
,
where d ∈ IR is a parameter.
The correlation between log(wk) and log(wk′), denoted ρk,k′ , is
ρk,k′ =
ak ak′σ
2
v1
+ bk bk′ σ
2
v2√
a2k σ
2
v1
+ b2k σ
2
v2
√
a2k′ σ
2
v1
+ b2k′ σ
2
v2
, (5)
where k, k′ = 1, . . ., K and σ2vj is the variance of vj , j=1,2. A positive correlation coefficient
between wj and wk implies that those who are likely to have high transition rates between any
given state and state j will also have high transition rates into state k.
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A two-factor loading model with two independent heterogeneity terms with common con-
tinuous distribution can also be derived from this specification. As before, let wk denote the
heterogeneity term for destination k:
wk = exp(ak v1 + bk v2),
where ak and bk are parameters (ak = 1I [k ≥ 2 ] and b1 = 1).
Here v1 and v2 are assumed to be independently and identically distributed. Let q(v; γ) be
the p.d.f. of v1 and v2. The correlations between log(wk) and log(wk′) are given by the same
expression as in (5). In principle, q(v; γ) represents any well-behaved distribution function.
The above specification can be further generalized to a three-factor loading model with
common continuous distribution. In this case the unobserved components depend on the des-
tination state as well as the current state. Let wj,k be specific to the transition between origin
j and destination k.
wj,k = w
′
j wk = exp(a
′
j v3 + b
′
j v2)× exp(ak v1 + bk v2), (6)
where a′j , b′j , ak and bk are parameters (a′j = ak = 1I [k ≥ 2 ], b1 = 1).
In this three-factor loading model, the correlation between destination states k and k′ is
ρk,k′ =
ak ak′ + bk bk′√
a2k + b
2
k
√
a2k′ + b
2
k′
. (7)
This correlation has the same interpretation as in the two-factor loading model.
On the other hand, the correlation between the two origin states j and j′ is given by
ρj,j′ =
a′j a′j′ + b′j b′j′√
a′2j + b′
2
j
√
a′2j′ + b′
2
j′
. (8)
A positive correlation indicates that those who have short spells in state j are likely to have
short spell duration in state j′ as well.
Finally, the correlation between origin state j and destination state k is given by
ρk,j =
b′j bk√
a′2j + b′
2
j
√
a2k + b
2
k
, (9)
where j, j′, k, k′ = 1, . . ., K. This correlation is somewhat trickier to interpret. A positive
coefficient indicates that those who are likely to have short spell duration in state j are also
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more likely to enter state k. Conversely, those who are more likely to have short spell duration
in state j are less likely to enter state k.
3.4 Specification of conditional hazard functions
Assume an individual is observed in state j during spell ` (i.e. xτ`−1 = j). Let ψ(j, k) denote
the heterogeneity term for destination k, given the individual is in state j. There are two
possibilities:
ψ(j, k) =
{
wk, in the two-factor loading model,
wj,k, in the three-factor loading model.
The conditional hazard function for transition (j, k) is given by
hj,k(u | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; ν; θ) = h0j,k(u; θ) ϕ(y1, . . ., y`−1; z; θ) ψ(j, k), (10)
where ϕ is a positive function of the exogenous variables and the sequence r, h0j,k(u; θ) is the
baseline hazard function for transition (j, k), and ψ(j, k) > 0.
We have considered three alternative conditional specifications for the baseline hazard
functions. For each transition, we have chosen among the following competing specifications
on the basis of non-parametric kernel estimations (see Fortin, Fougère and Lacroix (1999a)):
1. Log-logistic Distribution
The baseline hazard function is
h0j,k(u; θ) =
βj,k αj,k u
αj,k−1
(1 + βj,k uαj,k)
,
αj,k, βj,k ∈ IR+.
If αj,k > 1 then the hazard function is increasing then decreasing with respect of u. If
αj,k ≤ 1 then the hazard function is decreasing.
2. Piecewise-Constant Hazard Model
The expression of the baseline hazard function is
h0j,k(u; θ) = αj,k1I [u < u
0
1 ] + βj ,k 1I [u
0
1 ≤ u < u02 ] + γj ,k 1I [u02 ≤ u],
where αj,k, βj,k, γj,k ∈ IR+. u01 and u02 are fixed.
The baseline hazard function can be increasing then decreasing, decreasing then increas-
ing, strictly increasing or strictly decreasing.
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3. Weibull Distribution
The baseline hazard function is
h0j,k(u; θ) = αj,k βj,k u
αj,k−1,
αj,k, βj,k ∈ IR+.
If αj,k > 1 then the hazard function is increasing with respect of u. If αj,k < 1 then the
hazard function is decreasing with respect of u and if αj,k = 1 this conditional hazard
function is constant.
3.5 Estimation
We consider three alternative specifications for the unobserved heterogeneity distribution.
1. Two-Factor Loading and Discrete Distribution
The log likelihood is
log(L(θ)) =
N∑
i=1
log(li(θ)), (11)
where li(θ) is obtained by substituting the sequence ri = (y1,i, . . ., yni,i) and the ob-
served vector of covariates zi in (1). N is the size of the sample.
In equation (1) pij is set equal to11
pij =

p2, if j = 1,
p ∗ (1− p), if j = 2, 3,
(1− p)2, if j = 4,
where p ∈ [0; 1] is a parameter. The log-likelihood is then maximized with respect of θ
(θ ∈ Θ).
2. Two-Factor Loading and Continuous Distribution
The model includes two unobserved heterogeneity terms v1 and v2 (vj > 0, j = 1, 2).
We assume these terms to be independently and identically distributed. Let q(v; γ) be
the p.d.f. of vj , j = 1, 2.
The contribution of a given realization to the likelihood function is given by equation
(2), where ν = (v1, v2)′, V = IR+ × IR+ and g(ν; γ) = q(v1; γ) q(v2; γ). The log-
likelihood is given by equation (11), where li(θ) is the contribution to the likelihood of
11See section 4.
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the sequence ri.12 Since the integral in l(θ) cannot generally be analytically computed
it must be numerically simulated.
Let lˆ(θ) denote the estimator of the individual contribution to the likelihood function.
We assume that
lˆ(θ) =
1
H
H∑
h=1
n∏
`=1
f(y` | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; v1,h, v2,h; θ),
where v1,h and v2,h are drawn independently according to the p.d.f. q(v; γ). The draw-
ings vj,h (j = 1, 2, h = 1, . . ., H) are assumed to be specific to the individual. The
parameter estimates are obtained by maximizing the simulated log-likelihood:
log(L(θ)) =
N∑
i=1
log(lˆi(θ)),
where lˆi(θ) is the simulated contribution of the sequence ri to the likelihood function.
The maximization of this simulated likelihood yields consistent and efficient parameters
estimates if
√
N
H
→ 0 when H → +∞ and N → +∞ (see Gourriéroux and Monfort
(1991, 1996)). Under these conditions, this estimator has the same asymptotic distribu-
tion as the standard ML estimator. Following Laroque and Salanié (1993) and Kamion-
ka (1998) we have used 20 draws from the random distributions when estimating the
models. Using as few as 10 draws yielded essentially the same parameter estimates.
3. Three-Factor Loading and Continuous Distribution
In the three-factor loading model the conditional contribution must be integrated with
respect to the distribution of three independent unobserved heterogeneity terms. Let lˆ(θ)
denote the estimator of the individual contribution to the likelihood function. Assume
further that
lˆ(θ) =
1
H
H∑
h=1
n∏
`=1
f(y` | y1, . . ., y`−1; z; v1,h, v2,h, v3,h; θ),
where v1,h, v2,h and v3,h are drawn independently according to the p.d.f. q(ν; γ). Once
again, the parameter estimates obtained from maximizing this function are asymptoti-
cally efficient.
12In what follows, θ includes γ, the parameters of q(·).
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4 Estimation Results
This section presents the results of fitting the models outlined in the previous section to the
data at our disposal. The estimation of such complex models is computationally demanding.
Also, a number of issues must be addressed before dwelling into the results.
4.1 Functional Forms Assumptions
As mentioned in the previous section, it is necessary to specify a baseline distribution function
for each transition considered in the model. When selecting a particular functional form, a
number of desirable properties should be sought. First, the functional form should allow a
number of different shapes of the hazard function so that various combinations of positive
and negative duration dependence are possible. Second, it should roughly follow the pattern
of transitions times found in the data. Finally, the functional forms should involve as few
parameters as possible.
The data at our disposal was analyzed in Fortin et al. (1999a) using non-parametric kernel
hazard estimators. The baseline hazard functions were chosen on the basis of their analysis.
Table 3 reports the functional form used in each of the 24 transitions considered in the model.
Both the log-logistic and the piecewise constant functions allow non-monotonic hazards. For
many transitions, the empirical hazard functions initially increase for a short period of time
and then display an extended period of negative duration dependence. The log-logistic func-
tion is best suited in these cases. When the empirical hazard function looks relatively flat, it is
preferable to use an exponential model with a single parameter. Other non-monotone shapes
are best approximated with the piecewise constant hazard function. Monotone increasing or
decreasing empirical hazard rates can be satisfactorily approximated with a weibull distribu-
tion function.
4.2 Exogenous Covariates
Most studies on labour market transitions include a number of exogenous individual-specific
and macroeconomic variables. It is thus customary to include variables such as age, sex,
education and minority status to capture behavioural differences across these groups. In this
paper we have tried to limit the number of exogenous control variables as much as possible.
Given the unusually large number of transitions considered in the analysis, including even as
little as 10 exogenous variables would have over-parameterized the likelihood function and
rendered its estimation practically infeasible.
17
An alternative empirical strategy is to circumscribe the sample to relatively homogeneous
individuals in terms of observable characteristics. We have elected to concentrate our attention
on young and poorly educated men for two reasons: (1) They have fared relatively poorly on
the labour market over the past decade (see Beaudry and Green (1997)); (2) As a consequence
of their deteriorating labour market outcomes, many have claimed welfare benefits and have
been especially targeted for training programs. Having a relatively homogeneous sample in
terms of age and education does not remove the need to control for such variables explicitly.
Our sampling scheme insures that there is little variance in age at the start of the sample period
(see Table 1). As the initial individuals become older, new entrants 18–19 years of age join the
sample, thus increasing considerably the variance in age. On the other hand, the sample was
chosen so that educational attainment never exceeded 10 years of schooling. Consequently,
the variance in education remains relatively constant over the sample period.
We thus explicitly control for age in the regressions. Note that Gritz (1993) has found both
education and age to have little impact on any of the transitions considered in his model. The
following exogenous variables are included in the model in addition to age: minimum wage,
unemployment rate, welfare benefits, and dummy indicators for previous training under either
welfare or UI. The minimum wage and the welfare benefits are computed monthly and deflated
by the monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI). The monthly unemployment rate is computed for
men aged 25-64 for the Province of Québec. All the variables are computed at the beginning
of each spell and are assumed constant throughout the duration of individual spells.
4.3 Parameter Estimates
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates of a three-factor loading model that incorporates
a weibull distribution for the heterogeneity variables.13 The slope parameters of the non-
parametric and the (weibull) two-factor loading models are nearly identical to those presented
in Table 4 and are not reported for the sake of brevity.
Table 4 is divided into several panels. Each panel contains the parameter estimates for the
exit rates of a given state. The parameter estimates of the baseline hazard are presented first
followed by those of the control variables. The variable “Wel Tr1” is a dummy indicator that
13The model was also estimated using normal, student-t, χ2 and gamma distributions. The results based on
these specifications are not reported here for the sake of brevity, but are available on request. The specification
based on the weibull was preferred to all others for two reasons. First, the parameter estimates based on the
weibull distribution are very similar to those based on discrete distributions with a finite number of mass points.
Given the latter are robust to specification errors on the distribution of the heterogeneity components (see Heck-
man and Singer (1984)), the weibull distribution appears to depict similar properties. Second, as in Heckman
and Singer (1984), the value of likelihood function based on the weibull distribution is larger than those based
on other distributions.
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equals 1 if the individual has experienced a welfare training spell or has participated in JRP
at any time prior to the ongoing spell, and 0 otherwise. The variable “Wel Tr2” is a dummy
indicator that equals 1 if the state just prior to the current spell was either welfare training or
JRP, and 0 otherwise. The variables “UI Tr1” and “UI Tr2” are similarly defined but pertain to
UI training programs. The inclusion of “Wel Tr11” or “UI Tr1” alone implicitly assumes that
the impact of training programs does not wear off with time nor that it accumulate with repeat
uses. Including both “Wel Tr1” and “Wel Tr2” or “UI Tr1” and “UI Tr2” allows to determine
whether recent training has more impact than previous training on current spell duration. Both
past and recent training variables are included whenever feasible.
4.3.1 Exits from Welfare
The first panel of Table 4 focuses on exits from welfare. Exits to as many as five different
states are considered in the model. Parameters related to age indicate that as individuals get
older they are more likely to enter employment or OLF upon leaving welfare. In the latter
case, this may be an indication that they are more inclined to return to school. Increases in
the minimum wage rate increases the transitions towards welfare training, JRP and unemploy-
ment, but has no impact on transitions into employment. This result is compatible with the
results found in a recent paper by Fortin and Lacroix (1997). In that paper it was found us-
ing a similar sample that increases in the minimum wage rate increased exits from welfare.
Since the transition state was not known, this was interpreted as evidence that firms were not
constrained by the minimum wage rate. Instead, an increase in the latter was interpreted as
attracting a number of welfare claimants onto the labour market. The results reported here
provide a completely different story. Indeed, it appears that increases in the minimum wage
rate induce welfare claimants to increase their employability status but does not translate into
a larger number being employed. Quite to the contrary, the increased transition rates from wel-
fare to unemployment suggest that a number of individuals that were working while claiming
welfare benefits may have lost their job following the increase in the minimum wage rate.
Increases in the unemployment rate translate into smaller transition rates into JRP. This
result is compatible with the fact that welfare claimants may be less motivated to increase their
employability when job prospects diminish. Alternatively, firms may also be less inclined to
hire trainees under the JRP program when the unemployment rate rise.
As expected, increases in welfare benefits decrease the exit rates from welfare. The result
is statistically significant in transitions towards training, work and OLF states. A similar
finding was reported by Fortin and Lacroix in the aforementioned paper.
Past occurrences of welfare training are generally not very beneficial to the men in our
sample. They are associated with higher transition rates into welfare training and lower rates
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into employment and OLF. The impact is larger for recent occurrences, which suggests that
participation in such training programs may convey a bad signal to potential employers. On
the other hand, past occurrences of UI training has little impact on the exits from welfare.
4.3.2 Exits from Unemployment
The next panel of the table focuses on the transitions from unemployment. Most parameter
estimates that are statistically significant have the expected sign a priori. For instance, it is
found that as individuals get older they are more likely to exit unemployment for employment
and less for welfare. Similarly, increases in the minimum wage rate leads to higher transition
rates into UI training but lower rates into employment. These results are consistent with those
found with respect to exits from welfare.
Other results presented in the panel indicate that unemployed individuals are more likely
to experience a new unemployment spell or to enter welfare and are less likely to enter em-
ployment whenever the unemployment rate increases. Presumably, a number of UI claimants
can not find employment and therefore exhaust their benefits. The social security system in
Canada entitles them to welfare benefits upon exhaustion of UI benefits. On the other hand,
increases in welfare benefits increase the transition rates into welfare and lower those into un-
employment and employment. These results suggest that the transitions towards employment
are very sensitive to both policy variables, i.e. welfare benefits and minimum wages, as well
as to the state of the economy as proxied by the unemployment rate.
A number of parameter estimates relating to the training dummy variables are statistically
significant. Once again, previous participation in welfare training increases the likelihood of
entering welfare upon leaving unemployment and decreases that of entering employment. On
the other hand, recent UI training participation appears to have a conflicting impacts. Indeed,
UI claimants are more likely to enter either welfare or UI upon leaving unemployment but are
also more likely to enter employment. On the whole, these are consistent with those found
by Fortin, Fougère and Lacroix (1999b) using different data and econometric estimators and
are also consistent to some extent with those of Gritz (1993) and Bonnal et al. (1997). In
all three cases it was found that participation in government-sponsored training programs had
detrimental effects on the labour market experience of young men. It has been suggested that
potential employers may stigmatize participation in such training programs. Because these
programs are designed to improve the labour market opportunities of disadvantaged workers,
participation in the later may be taken as a signal of unsatisfactory performance in previous
employment. Our results indicate that training while on welfare is detrimental to men, but
training while on unemployment does not convey the same negative signal.
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4.3.3 Exits from Employment
The next panel of the table reports results relating to transitions from employment. Once again,
most parameters estimates that are statistically significant have the expected sign. In particular,
increases in the minimum wage rate is found to increase the likelihood of leaving employment
for either welfare training, and to diminish considerably the likelihood of entering a new job
or moving into welfare. Increases in welfare benefits are found to increase the transitions into
welfare and to decrease the likelihood of entering welfare training.
The parameter estimates associated with the unemployment rate has the expected sign ex-
cept perhaps with respect to transitions between employment and unemployment. Indeed, the
parameter estimate implies that whenever the unemployment rate increases, workers are less
likely to leave employment to enter unemployment. There are several potential explanations
for this result. First, it may well be that when the labour market deteriorates, workers who
loose their job have difficulty qualify for UI benefits. Recall from Table 1 that the uncondi-
tional mean job duration is approximately 18 weeks. which is roughly equal to the qualifying
period. They are thus more likely to turn to welfare, as indicated in the first column of the
panel. Second, the deterioration of the labour market may induce some to hold on to their
current job longer. The fact that all the parameter estimates are negative, except for welfare,
is consistent with this possibility. Finally, increases in welfare benefits increase the transitions
from employment to welfare, as expected.
The training variables show interesting results. For instance, those who have participat-
ed in welfare training are more likely to enter either welfare or welfare training upon exit-
ing employment, although recent participation makes them less likely to enter welfare anew.
Likewise, participation in welfare training translates into less employment–employment tran-
sitions. Those who were in UI training just prior to their current employment spell are much
more likely to return to UI upon leaving employment and much less likely to experience an
employment-employment transition. The likelihood of entering the OLF state following em-
ployment decreases substantially if the individual experienced either UI or welfare training in
the past.
4.3.4 Exits from OLF
The results presented in the following panel relate to the OLF state. Recall that this state in-
cludes individuals that are truly out of the labour force but may also include full-time students
and non-entitled unemployed workers. Caution must thus be exercised in interpreting these
results.
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Surprisingly many parameter estimates turn out to be statistically significant. Of particular
interest, transitions from OLF to employment appear to be quite sensitive to the economic
environment. Transitions to employment are thus less when the minimum wage rate or the
welfare benefits increase. Similarly, the transitions into welfare and welfare training are rela-
tively sensitive to policy variables. As in previous panels, the transitions into welfare training
are more likely for those who have previously experienced such training.
For the sake of brevity, the estimation results for training programs are presented in a
separate table in an appendix. The econometric model generally does a poorer job at predict-
ing transitions from the training programs compared to those for other states of the labour
market,although a number of parameter estimates are statistically significant.
4.3.5 Unobserved Heterogeneity
Table 5 reports the value of the likelihood function for a number of different specifications as
well as the parameter estimates related to the unobserved heterogeneity of each. As mentioned
earlier, the slope parameters of these specifications are sufficiently similar to omit them from
the tables.14
The first specification of the table does not control for unobserved heterogeneity and is thus
a special case of all the other specifications. A simple likelihood-ratio test strongly rejects the
first specification in favour of any specification that includes unobserved heterogeneity. The
second specification is a standard non-parametric two-factor loading model and was presented
in equation (4). Most parameter estimates are statistically significant, except for b2 and b5
which concern transitions into welfare training programs and UI training programs, respec-
tively. Accordingly, these estimates suggest there is little, if any, selectivity into these two
training programs.
The third column of the table reports the parameter estimates of a parametric two-factor
loading model. As was mentioned earlier, the weibull distribution function was preferred over
all other distribution functions that were investigated. Notice that as in the non-parametric
specification, only b2 and b5 are not statistically significant. The last two lines of the table
report the parameter estimates of the weibull distribution, λ and γ.15 Finally, the last column of
the table presents the parameter estimates of the three-factor loading model (see equation(6)),
whose slope parameters were presented in Table 4. A simple log-likelihood ratio test rejects
14Bonnal et al. (1997) also found the slope parameters to be relatively insensitive to the distributional assump-
tions of the unobserved heterogeneity variables. In their work, they compare a two-factor loading model with
a finite number of points of support with a single-factor loading model that draws heterogeneity terms from an
i.i.d. IN(0, 1) distribution. The insensitivity of the slope parameters to the distributional assumption is consistent
with the results of Heckman and Singer (1984) using single durations data.
15The weibull distribution function of a random variable x is given by F (x) = 1− exp [−λxγ ].
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the two-factor loading model in favour of the three-factor loading model. Contrary to the two
previous specifications, b2 is now highly statistically significant. Furthermore, nearly all the
b′j parameters are statistically significant. This suggests that the richer specification may be
better suited to uncover selection into the different states.
In order to investigate this issue, Table 6 reports the correlation coefficients between the
heterogeneity variables that are implicit in each specification along with their standard errors.
The first two panels focus on the non-parametric and the weibull two-factor loading models.
Recall that these correlation coefficients indicate the extent to which one is as likely to enter
state j as state k upon leaving any given state. While a number of coefficients are similar
across both panels, there are significant differences. To start with, the first line of each panel
shows that high transition rates into welfare are associated with lower transition rates into
welfare training and higher rates into unemployment. On the other hand, both panels disagree
significantly with respect to the correlations between welfare training and the other states, as
well as between JRP and other states. The non-parametric model implies that welfare training
and UI training are positively correlated whereas the opposite holds true in the parametric
model. Similarly, the top panel indicates that JRP is positively correlated to all other states on
the labour market, contrary to the parametric model which shows no such relations.
The last panel of Table 6 focuses on the correlation coefficients implicit in the three-factor
loading model. Each section of the panel is related to the correlation coefficients in equations
(7)–(9), respectively. Hence, the first section has the same interpretation as the correlations of
the previous panels. The correlation coefficients reported in this section differ considerably
from the previous ones. According to the estimates, it now appears that there is considerable
selectivity into welfare training as well as in JRP. Indeed, those who are more likely to par-
ticipate in the former are also more likely to train under JRP and to find employment. On the
other hand, higher transition rates into JRP or welfare training is now associated with lower
transition rates into UI and UI training. This is in stark contrast with the previous results.
Other correlation coefficients are relatively similar to the previous ones.
The second section of the panel reports the correlation coefficients with respect to the
origin states. Large heterogeneity values in the origin state translate into short spell durations.
Consequently, the correlations reflect the frequency with which individuals transit across the
various states. The estimates show that individuals who are more likely to have long welfare
spells are also likely to have short employment spells. The same holds with respect to welfare
training and employment, as well as JRP and employment. Those who are more likely to have
short unemployment spells are more likely to have long JRP, welfare training or UI training
spells.
The last section of the panel reports the implicit correlations between the origin and the
destination states. Note that the correlation matrix need not be symmetric nor does the diag-
onal need be equal to unity. On the other hand, the restrictions that were imposed to achieve
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identification of the loading parameters imply that the first row of the matrix is equal to the
first row of the matrix of the middle section.
For the sake of brevity we will focus our attention on the most interesting correlations.
The estimates suggest that those who are likely to have short welfare training spells are also
less likely to transit through welfare or JRP and more likely to enter employment. (row 2).
Similarly, row 3 indicates that individuals who are likely to have short JRP spells are less
likely to return to either welfare or welfare training in the future, and much more likely to enter
employment. Finally, those who have short UI training spells (row 5) have higher transitions
rates into welfare and welfare training, and lower transitions rates into employment.
These correlations suggest there is considerable selectivity into the training programs. Fur-
thermore, they show that those who are selected into welfare and JRP training programs ap-
pear to be different from those who participate in UI training programs. As a matter of fact,
all the correlation coefficients of the last section of the panel pertaining to UI training have
the opposite sign to those of welfare and JRP training. Consider, for example, those who have
unexpectedly long UI training spells and those who have unexpectedly short welfare training
or JRP spells. According to the last section of the panel, all these individuals are more likely
to move into employment upon exiting their respective spells than average. Yet, the middle
section indicates that only those on welfare training or JRP are likely to have long employment
spells. Those who were on UI training are more likely to have short employment spells.
That those who are likely to have short JRP or welfare training spells are more likely
to experiment long employment spells may be somewhat surprising. In fact, when studying
the impact of the Youth Training Scheme in the UK, Mealli et al. (1996) conjectured that
early program termination may result from more intensive search stemming from better than
average motivation. Hence, early termination may be associated with a higher probability of
transition into employment and longer employment spells. Conversely, if failure to complete
the full term is a consequence of low ability and motivation, it may be associated with poorer
employment outcomes. Although we have no information regarding program completion,
our results are consistent with the first possibility, whereas those of Mealli et al. (1996) were
consistent with the second possibility.
5 Conclusion
The analysis has focused on an examination of the impact of government-sponsored training
programs aimed at disadvantaged male youths on their labour market transitions. We have
elected to concentrate our attention on this group since they have fared relatively poorly on
the labour market over the past decade in Canada by all accounts. The richness of the data at
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our disposal has allowed us to recreate very detailed individual histories over a relatively long
period. As many as seven distinct states on the labour market could be identified in the data.
This study has applied a continuous time duration model to estimate the density of du-
ration times in these seven states, controlling for the endogeneity of an individual’s training
status. Most previous studies have used survey or administrative data that were less amenable
to the kind of analysis performed in this paper. Depending on the nature of the data, complex
adjustments to the model were often required to account for potential problems related to s-
tock sampling and initial conditions. Fortunately, we were able to avoid these difficulties by
recreating each individual’s history as early as age 16, the legal school-leaving age in Cana-
da. Consequently, the initial state can be safely considered exogenous, and the subsequent
duration times void of any form of bias.
There is no consensus in the literature concerning the appropriate treatment of unobserved
heterogeneity in multi-states multi-episodes duration models. When few states are considered,
two-factor loading models with a finite set of points of support have become relatively stan-
dard. When the analysis focuses on more states, factor loading models require a large number
of parameters to be flexible or become relatively restrictive if a parsimonious specification is
used. In this paper we have chosen to investigate the sensitivity of the parameter estimates by
comparing a typical non-parametric specification and a series of parametric two-factor loading
models. These models implicitly assume that the intensity of transitions are related to the state
of destination. We have also estimated a parametric three-factor loading model. The novelty
of this specification lies in the fact that the intensities of transitions are related to both to the
state of destination and the state of origin.
The estimation of the model yields a number of interesting results. As found in previous
studies, unobserved heterogeneity appears to play an important role in determining who se-
lects or gets selected in training programs. On the other hand, the slope and baseline hazard
parameter estimates are not very sensitive to the choice of a particular distribution function
for the unobserved heterogeneity variables. The two-factor loading models, either parametric
or non-parametric, yield essentially the same results as the three-factor loading model. These
show that the duration times in any of the seven states considered are sensitive to variations
in program parameters such as welfare benefits, policy variables such as the minimum wage
rate, and in the economic environment as proxied by the unemployment rate. Nearly all the
parameter estimates have the expected sign when statistically significant.
The results pertaining to the impact of the welfare training programs and JRP are simi-
lar to those found earlier by Gritz (1993), Bonnal et al. (1997) and Fortin et al. (1999a). In
essence, young, poorly educated males who participate in these programs do not fair as well
on the labour market compared to non-participants, even after controlling for unobserved het-
erogeneity. On the other hand, participation in training programs while on unemployment
insurance provides them some benefits in the form of increased transitions into employment.
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Table 1
Sample Characteristics
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Non Trainees
Age in January 1987 18.93 0.57
Education 9.84 1.03
Duration of employment spells (weeks)
 
19.70 26.12
Duration of welfare spells (weeks)
 
48.54 51.47
Duration of unemployment spells (weeks)
 
40.46 14.27
Proportion of time employed (%)

18.12
Number of observations 1935
Trainees
Age in January 1987 18.92 0.57
Education 9.72 1.03
Before training After training
Duration of employment spells (weeks)
 
17.52 24.58 15.98 16.78
Duration of welfare spells (weeks)
 
45.57 47.10 32.77 45.47
Duration of unemployment spells (weeks)
 
39.55 14.52 31.89 17.53
Proportion of time employed (%)

17.06 19.82
Number of observations 1133

Calculated from non censored spells.

Calculated from mean duration in employment, unemployment, welfare and OLF.
Table 2
Frequency of Transitions Between States
Destination Welfare Welfare JRP U.I. U.I. Employment OLF
Origin Training Training
Welfare 0 1809 140 88 0 1851 1134
Welfare Training 432 0 67 6 0 438 306
JRP 21 4 0 7 0 192 29
U.I. 374 38 2 292 111 1380 1404
U.I. Training 2 1 0 114 0 16 2
Employment 1002 229 35 2918 41 2004 4662
OLF 2614 235 9 523 2 3815 0
Table 3
Baseline Hazard Functional Forms

Dest. Welfare Welfare JRP U.I. U.I. Emp. OLF
Origin Training Training
Welfare Exp (1) Exp (1) Exp (1) Exp (3) Exp (1)
Wel Tr Log-logis. Log-logis. Log-logis.
JRP Exp (1)
U.I. Exp (2) Exp (2) Exp (1) Exp (2) Exp(2)
U.I. Tr Exp(1)
Emp Log-logis. Weibull Log-logis. Log-logis. Log-logis.
OLF Exp (2) Exp (2) Exp (2) Exp (2)
 
“Exp” refers to exponential piecewise constant hazard model. The number
of parameters are indicated between parentheses.
Table 4
Parameter Estimates
Three-Factor Loading Model – Weibull Distribution
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Exits from Welfare
State of Destination
Welfare Wel Tr JRP UI UI Tr Emp OLF
Baseline: -14.863 -12.632 -18.401 -3.383 -6.563
(0.487) (2.188) (2.124) (0.370) (0.443)
-3.754
(0.373)
-4.437
(0.375)
Age -0.203 -0.376 0.613 0.597 1.043
(0.162) (0.589) (0.657) (0.156) (0.183)
Min Wage 21.861 16.971 21.284 -1.339 -2.255
(1.182) (5.310) (4.923) (0.980) (1.143)
Unemp Rate -0.281 -1.993 -1.132 -0.182 0.404
(0.288) (0.970) (0.977) (0.207) (0.245)
Benefits -1.878 0.415 0.205 -1.438 -0.791
(0.361) (1.111) (1.081) (0.249) (0.264)
Wel Tr  0.228 0.515 0.168 -0.123 -0.326
(0.139) (0.348) (0.417) (0.117) (0.173)
Wel Tr  0.680 -0.177 -2.020 -0.421 -0.119
(0.142) (0.459) (1.216) (0.165) (0.255)
UI Tr  0.227 0.101 0.609 0.232 0.562
(0.243) (0.751) (0.740) (0.200) (0.234)
UI Tr 
Exits from Unemployment
State of Destination
Welfare Wel Tr JRP UI UI Tr Emp OLF
Baseline: -7.659 -8.656 -14.295 -3.440 -5.536
(1.014) (0.988) (1.832) (0.440) (0.482)
-4.468 -4.156 -1.241 -2.525
(0.988) (0.973) (0.445) (0.482)
Age -0.682 0.317 -0.597 0.472 -0.297
(0.358) (0.407) (0.614) (0.191) (0.187)
Min Wage -0.245 -0.376 16.074 -2.563 1.813
(2.632) (2.791) (4.458) (1.429) (1.447)
Unemp Rate 1.556 1.014 -0.063 -0.440 -0.182
(0.534) (0.564) (0.973) (0.279) (0.270)
Benefits 1.715 -1.200 0.073 -0.536 -0.272
(0.465) (0.592) (1.142) (0.264) (0.340)
Wel Tr  0.556 0.330 -0.337 -0.329 -0.107
(0.273) (0.345) (0.474) (0.184) (0.184)
Wel Tr 
UI Tr  -0.091 0.293 -0.126 0.150 0.060
(0.514) (0.509) (0.537) (0.266) (0.262)
UI Tr  2.261 1.406 0.727 1.401
(0.593) (0.631) (0.372) (0.345)
Table 4 (continued)
Parameter Estimates
Three-Factor Loading Model – Weibull Distribution
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Exits from Employment
State of Destination
Welfare Wel Tr JRP UI UI Tr Emp OLF
Baseline: -4.891 -24.613 -6.445 -4.744 -6.332
(0.376) (1.710) (0.091) 0.197) (0.202)
1.310 -0.032 0.652 1.162 1.636
(0.093) (0.096) (0.023) (0.055) (0.037)
Age -0.485 0.715 0.692 -0.038 -1.369
(0.177) (0.345) (0.111) (0.125) (0.078)
Min Wage -8.842 35.002 -0.583 -2.145 1.317
(0.972) (3.316) (0.625) (0.720) (0.450)
Unemp Rate 0.966 -2.229 -0.865 -0.993 -0.851
(0.264) (0.658) (0.174) (0.205) (0.130)
Benefits 1.722 -1.619 -0.041 -0.217 0.319
(0.221) (0.776) (0.148) (0.170) (0.105)
Wel Tr  1.326 1.311 0.104 -0.273 -0.081
(0.121) (0.223) (0.120) (0.154) (0.104)
Wel Tr  -0.914 0.587 -0.098 -0.126 -0.688
(0.190) (0.215) (0.158) (0.218) (0.157)
UI Tr  0.143 -1.070 -0.117 0.004 -0.341
(0.259) (0.642) (0.151) (0.183) (0.180)
UI Tr  1.580 -0.648 -1.222
(0.339) (1.190) (1.326)
Exits from OLF
State of Destination
Welfare Wel Tr JRP UI UI Tr Emp OLF
Baseline: -7.227 -9.808 -0.815 -0.815
(0.265) (0.533) (0.224) (0.224)
-8.063 -10.690 -1.139 -1.139
(0.259) (0.532) (0.223) (0.223)
Age -0.274 -0.061 1.035 -0.242
(0.124) (0.331) (0.275) (0.103)
Min Wage -0.510 9.572 -2.582 -2.946
(0.126) (2.086) (0.332) (0.108)
Unemp Rate 9.031 -1.347 12.763 3.357
(0.675) (0.576) (1.615) (0.638)
Benefits 0.325 -0.173 -1.436 -0.489
(0.185) (0.991) (0.360) (0.144)
Wel Tr  0.075 1.673 -1.404 -0.112
(0.097) (0.214) (0.386) (0.122)
Wel Tr  -1.537 0.458 -0.240 -0.728
(0.222) (0.233) (0.553) (0.218)
UI Tr  0.032 0.533 -0.722 0.151
(0.158) (0.419) (0.556) (0.162)
UI Tr 
Table 5
Heterogeneity Parameters for Selected Models
(Standard errors in parentheses)
No Non Two Factor Three Factor
Hetero- Parametric Loading Loading
geneity Model Model Model
Weibull Weibull
Distribution Distribution

0.899
(0.070)

 -0.753
(0.049)

 -1.566
(0.023)

 0.223 0.242 -2.169
(0.128) (0.342) (0.830)

	
2.757 7.510 7.487
(1.139) (2.177) (3.349)


1.271 5.133 7.196
(0.135) (0.700) (1.187)

0.419 -0.875 -1.632
(1.049) (2.714) (5.049)


1.500 5.408 8.073
(0.096) (0.632) (1.087)

-0.866 -2.410 -6.078
(0.068) (0.273) (1.099)


2.974
(0.812)



3.395
(1.071)

	
-8.281
(2.512)


 1.073
(0.926)



-7.296
(5.031)


 1.922
(0.680)

 1.296
(0.459)

7.952 13.008
(1.069) (2.269)
 0.145 0.100
(0.056) (0.059)
Log- -150629.1 -149998.7 -150018.4 -149993.9
Likelihood
Table 6
Correlations Between Heterogeneity Variables
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Welfare Welf. Tr. JRP UI UI Tr. Employ. OLF
TWO-FACTOR LOADING MODEL: NON-PARAMETRIC
Welfare 1.000 -0.398 0.062 0.607 0.332 0.115 0.384
(0.154) (0.045) (0.243) (0.142) (0.289) (0.156)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 0.891 0.487 0.733 0.865 0.694
(0.091) (0.390) (0.216) (0.181) (0.242)
JRP 1.000 0.831 0.962 0.999 0.945
(0.159) (0.035) (0.016) (0.047)
UI 1.000 0.951 0.859 0.967
(0.067) (0.202) (0.053)
UI Tr. 1.000 0.975 0.998
(0.067) (0.002)
Emplo. 1.000 0.962
(0.085)
Table 6 (Continued)
Correlations Between Heterogeneity Variables
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Welfare Welf. Tr. JRP UI UI Tr. Employ. OLF
TWO-FACTOR LOADING MODEL: WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION
Welfare 1.000 -0.443 0.235 0.991 0.982 -0.659 0.983
(0.108) (0.315) (0.005) (0.005) (1.157) (0.004)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 0.767 -0.321 -0.264 0.967 -0.273
(0.226) (0.118) (0.119) (0.395) (0.118)
JRP 1.000 0.361 0.416 0.577 0.408
(0.299) (0.293) (1.291) (0.294)
U.I. 1.000 0.998 -0.553 0.999
(0.002) (1.282) (0.002)
UI Tr. 1.000 -0.502 0.999
(1.328) (0.001)
Emplo. 1.000 -0.511
(1.322)
Table 6 (Continued)
Correlations Between Heterogeneity Variables
Three-Factor Loading Model
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Welfare Welf. Tr. JRP UI UI Tr. Employ. OLF
CORRELATION BETWEEN DESTINATION STATES
Welfare 1.000 -0.439 -0.908 0.991 0.990 -0.853 0.992
(0.104) (0.061) (0.008) (0.003) (0.720) (0.002)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 0.775 -0.317 -0.312 0.844 -0.326
(0.119) (0.122) (0.113) (0.740) (0.111)
JRP 1.000 -0.845 -0.842 0.993 -0.850
(0.085) (0.082) (0.162) (0.080)
UI 1.000 0.999 -0.776 0.999
(0.001) (0.871) (0.001)
UI Tr. 1.000 -0.773 0.999
(0.874) (0.001)
Emplo. 1.000 -0.782
(0.859)
CORRELATION BETWEEN ORIGIN STATES
Welfare 1.000 0.948 0.959 -0.993 0.731 -0.991 0.887
(0.026) (0.024) (0.004) (0.294) (0.013) (0.067)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 0.999 -0.903 0.911 -0.896 0.988
(0.003) (0.041) (0.163) (0.058) (0.014)
JRP 1.000 -0.918 0.894 -0.912 0.981
(0.039) (0.182) (0.054) (0.022)
U.I. 1.000 -0.644 0.999 -0.825
(0.331) (0.002) (0.087)
UI Tr. 1.000 -0.632 0.964
(0.344) (0.098)
Emplo. 1.000 -0.816
(0.102)
CORRELATION BETWEEN ORIGIN-DESTINATION STATES
Welfare 1.000 0.948 0.959 -0.993 0.731 -0.991 0.887
(0.026) (0.024) (0.004) (0.294) (0.013) (0.067)
Wel. Tr. -0.439 -0.416 -0.421 0.436 -0.321 0.435 -0.390
(0.104) (0.100) (0.101) (0.104) (0.149) (0.104) (0.097)
JRP -0.908 -0.861 -0.871 0.902 -0.664 0.900 -0.806
(0.061) (0.077) (0.071) (0.061) (0.289) (0.062) (0.104)
UI 0.991 0.940 0.951 -0.984 0.725 -0.982 0.879
(0.008) (0.028) (0.026) (0.009) (0.292) (0.015) (0.068)
UI Tr. 0.990 0.939 0.950 -0.983 0.725 -0.981 0.879
(0.003) (0.027) (0.025) (0.006) (0.291) (0.014) (0.067)
Emplo. -0.853 -0.808 -0.818 0.847 -0.624 0.845 -0.756
(0.720) (0.684) (0.692) (0.715) (0.641) (0.714) (0.647)
OLF 0.992 0.941 0.952 -0.985 0.726 -0.983 0.880
(0.002) (0.027) (0.025) (0.005) (0.292) (0.013) (0.067)

Appendix I
Parameter Estimates
Three-Factor Loading Model – Weibull Distribution
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Exits from Training Programs
Exits
Exits from
from UI
Exits from Welfare Training JRP Training
Welfare Emp OLF Emp UI
Baseline: -5.231 -4.221 -5.018 -9.017 1.102
(0.387) (0.261) (0.332) (2.417) (2.096)
0.744 0.232 0.313
(0.112) (0.096) (0.125)
Age 0.214 0.365 0.042 0.552 -0.906
(0.279) (0.256) (0.268) (0.657) (0.759)
Min Wage 5.319 0.028 -2.857 13.263 -7.681
(1.745) (1.751) (1.983) (4.174) (6.215)
Unemp Rate -3.036 -0.532 -0.062 -1.336 1.562
(0.469) (0.511) (0.553) (0.930) (1.138)
Benefits -3.592 -1.021 0.242 -0.967 0.457
(0.523) (0.603) (0.669) (1.913) (1.138)
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